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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Eric Michael Ross appeals from district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence. In the district court, he asserted that, following a traffic stop, 
officers illegally searched luggage in the trunk of the car he was driving. The district 
court denied the motion, and Mr. Ross entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count 
of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of trafficking in methamphetamine, 
which preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In April 2014, Mr. Ross was pulled over for failing to signal for a full five seconds 
before changing lanes. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.31, L.16 - p.32, L.1, p.88, L.12 p.89, L.11.) 
Ultimately, after almost 50 minutes, the officers seized his luggage in the trunk and 
searched it on the theory, according to one of the deputies, that "I don't know what's in 
those bags. Could potentially be something to harm me or my partner." (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 (hereinafter, Video) at 50:30 - 54:00; Tr. 9/30/14, p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.5.) 
Kootenai County Sheriff's Deputies Gorham and Hyle were working as part of a 
"criminal interdiction unit" at the time of the stop. (Tr. 9/30/14 p.29, L.19 - p.30, L.1.) At 
the suppression hearing, they testified that upon approaching the vehicle, they noticed 
that Mr. Ross and his passenger, Mr. Cummings, were "nervous"; that a "wooden 
handle that appeared to be for an axe without the blade" lay on the floorboard; and that 
the passenger was talking on his cell phone telling someone they had been pulled over. 
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.34, L.17 - p.36, L.12, p.90, Ls.5-14.) When Deputy Gorham asked 
Mr. Ross for his license and registration, Mr. Ross explained that the car was a rental 
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and that he only had his ID card with him (Tr. 9/30/14, p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.3.) Mr. Ross 
explained that he lived in Montana with Alex Hunter, the person who had rented 
the car. 1 (Video at 4:15 - 4:30.) When Mr. Ross could not find the rental agreement 
anywhere in the car, Deputy Gorham said he would call the rental company to ask 
about the car's status. (Video at 4:30- 6:10.) 
At that point, Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross to step out of the car. (Tr. 9/30/14, 
p.34, Ls.11 - 16.) He testified that people are not usually talking on the phone when he 
pulls them over, and when he stops people whom he thinks are nervous, it leads him to 
believe "criminal activity may be afoot .... '' (Tr. 9/30/14, p.34, L.17 - p.35, L.6.) This 
prompted him to tell Mr. Ross to get out of his car because, as he testified, he liked to 
get people "out of the comfort zone," and "put them in my comfort zone where I feel 
more comfortable with them." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.35, Ls.4-9.) 
After Mr. Ross stepped out of the car, Deputy Gorham asked him if he had any 
weapons on his person, and Mr. Ross told him he had a pocket knife. (Tr. 9/30/14, 
p.65, Ls.2-3.) Deputy Gorham asked Mr. Ross to put the pocket knife back in the car, 
and Mr. Ross complied. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.65, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Ross also consented to be 
frisked for additional weapons. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.65, Ls.9-13.) Deputy Gorham found 
nothing during that frisk and then asked Mr. Ross to sit with him in the front seat of the 
patrol vehicle. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.37, Ls.12-23.) Once in the vehicle, Mr. Ross told Deputy 
Gorham that his driver's license was suspended. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.39, Ls.11-12.) A 
background check revealed no outstanding warrants and no violent prior offenses. 
1 At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ross also testified that Mr. Hunter was his "best friend 
and boss." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.22, Ls.19-23.) 
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9/30/14, p.68, L.21 - p.69, L.15.) According to Deputy Gorham, although dispatch 
told him of a drug-related history, "I don't remember saying that he came back with any 
violence. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.69, Ls.11-13.) Further, Deputy Gorham described Mr. Ross's 
demeanor throughout the process as "very cordial." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.67, Ls.6-17.) 
Dispatch also informed Deputy Gorham that the rental company confirmed that 
the car had been rented to Alex Hunter and that Mr. Ross was not a driver authorized 
by the rental car company. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.77, Ls.13-18, p.44, Ls.13-14.) At this point, 
Deputy Gorham issued Mr. Ross a citation for driving without privileges, which Mr. Ross 
signed. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.67, Ls.6-13.) Deputy Gorham then called an employee of the 
rental car company, who requested the car be towed to their offices. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.44, 
L.9 - p.45, L.8.) But Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross he was going to "impound" the car, 
so Mr. Ross asked to get his luggage out of the trunk. 2 (Tr. 9/30/14, p.69, L.16 - p.70, 
L.6.) Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross that he could only have his luggage if he first 
allowed the deputies to search it. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.70, Ls.7-9.) 
When asked why he would not give Mr. Ross his property, Deputy Gorham said 
that "based off everything that I've seen and the weapons we've located so far ... I 
didn't feel safe giving his stuff back without first conducting a search for weapons .... " 
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.45, Ls.17-21.) When asked to expand on why he was fearful, Deputy 
Gorham repeated that the men seemed nervous to him, referenced their drug-related 
criminal backgrounds, and made the statement that, because he did not know what was 
2 Deputy Gorham testified that he told Mr. Ross he was free to go at this point. 
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.69, Ls.19-25.) However, in the video, there is no indication that Deputy 
Gorham made this statement until approximately 25 minutes later. (See Video at 25:20 
- 25:50, 49:00 - 49:15.) 
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Mr. Ross's belongings, there could potentially be something to harm him or his 
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.45, L.22 - p.46, L. According to Deputy Gorham, "drugs and 
weapons and violence all generally the same crime. A lot of drug-related crimes that 
stem from violence or drugs and weapons and guns." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.46, L.16 - p.47, 
1.) 
Mr. Ross did not consent to have his bags searched.3 (Tr. 9/30/14, p.46, 
Ls.5-10.) Ultimately, Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross that he could pick up his property 
from the rental car company, after Mr. Ross agreed to leave his bags in the trunk and 
told Deputy Gorham that the duffel bag in the trunk belonged to Mr. Hunter.4 
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.49, Ls.3-14, p.46, Ls.7-10.) Deputy Gorham then told Mr. Ross he 
would be performing an inventory search of the bags. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.49, L.21 - p.50, 
L.B.) It had, at this point, been almost 25 minutes since Deputy Gorham issued 
Mr. Ross the citation for driving without privileges and told him that the car would be 
towed. (Video at 25:20 - 25:50, 49:00 - 49:15.) Mr. Ross was never issued a citation 
for failing to signal a lane change for a full five seconds. 
As Mr. Ross and Mr. Cummings walked down the highway to meet someone who 
was picking them up, the deputies immediately began searching through the luggage. 
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.49, L.21 - p.50, L.2, p.51, L.8 - p.52, L.2; Video at 52:50.) None of them 
were completing any paperwork or possessed any forms whatsoever for the completion 
of the so-called inventory search. (Video at 52:50 - 53:30.) Deputy Hyle testified at the 
suppression hearing that the Sheriff's department protocol required that forms be filled 
3 Mr. Cummings consented to a search of his backpack, and Deputy Gorham searched 
it before letting him take it. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.46, Ls.5-7.) 
4 
out when doing an inventory search and that his role was completing that paperwork. 
9/30/14, p.92, Ls.11-23.) The video, however, clearly shows that this did not occur. 
(Video at 52:50 - 53:30.) 
In their search through the duffel bag, the deputies discovered a small pink 
handgun and an aerosol can that contained what Deputy Gorham believed to be 
methamphetamine. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.51, L.25 - p.53, L.21.) The deputies then drove 
back down the highway and arrested Mr. Ross and Mr. Cummings. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.54, 
Ls.2-7.) After that, the deputies returned to the car and conducted a "probable cause 
search of the vehicle," during which they found a digital scale and more 
methamphetamine. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.54, Ls.8-24.) 
Mr. Ross was initially charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, 
one count of trafficking in methamphetamine, one count of driving without privileges and 
a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.104-06.) He filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence found in the car, but the district court denied the motion (R., pp.50-51, 192-
202.) It held that: the initial stop was justified5; Mr. Ross did not have standing to 
contest the search; and, even if Mr. Ross did have standing, the length of his detention 
was not unreasonable, and the search was reasonable. (R., pp.192-202.) 
Subsequently, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Ross entered a conditional Alforc/3 
plea to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and a conditional plea to one 
count of trafficking in methamphetamine. (Tr. 11/12/14, p.114, L.2 - p.120, L.20.) 
4 At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ross testified that all the bags in the trunk belonged to 
him. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.27, L.8 - p.28, L.8.) 
5 Mr. Ross is not challenging the justification for the traffic stop. 
6 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
5 
Mr. Ross then filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from district court's 
Sentencing Disposition and Notice of Right AppeaL (R., pp.220-23.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross's motion to suppress because 
he had standing challenge the reasonableness his detention and the search 
of the car? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross's motion to suppress because 
the deputies unlawfully extended the traffic stop? 
3. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross's motion to suppress because 
Deputy Gorham would not let Mr. Ross take his luggage without searching it first, 
and the inventory search was not performed according to protocol? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress Because He 
Had Standing To Challenge The Reasonableness Of His Detention And The Search Of 
The Car 
A. Introduction 
The district court held that Mr. Ross did not have standing to contest the search 
of the car. However, it also held that if Mr. Ross was found to have standing, he was 
not illegally detained. Thus, the district court implied that Mr. Ross did not have 
standing to contest either his detention or the subsequent search. Mr. Ross not only 
had standing to challenge the reasonableness of his detention, he also had standing to 
contest the search because Mr. Ross's friend gave Mr. Ross permission to drive the 
car. 
8. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated 
standard. State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998). The Court accepts the 
trial court's determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews 
"the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. Thus, the Court 
has free review as to whether the police officer's actions were permitted under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution. State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 604 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress 
Because Mr. Ross Had Standing To Challenge The Reasonableness Of His 
Detention And The Search Of The Car 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution protect ''[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17. The purpose of this constitutional right 
is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by 
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against 
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). Searches or 
detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129 
(Ct. App. 2002). 
A traffic stop is a seizure of the driver in a vehicle and "is therefore subject to 
Fourth Amendment strictures, but because it is limited in scope and duration, it is 
analogous to an investigative detention." State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App. 
2008). "Because a seizure results in restrictions to an individual's personal freedom, 
any individual in a seized vehicle has standing to challenge the validity and 
reasonableness of the stop." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(emphasis added) (citing State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 406 (1984)). Therefore, 
Mr. Ross had standing to challenge the reasonableness of his detention. 
With respect to the search of the car, because the authorized driver of the car, 
Mr. Hunter, gave Mr. Ross permission to drive the vehicle, Mr. Ross had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the car. The United States Supreme Court has 
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held that the test for determining whether a defendant has standing or the "capacity to 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . upon whether the person 
who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the invaded place." Rakas v Illinois, 439 U.S 128, 143 (1978) The Court has 
developed a two-prong test for finding a legitimate expectation of privacy: first, a 
defendant must demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, the 
subjective expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively 
reasonable. United States v Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). However, neither Rakas 
nor Katz provided significant guidance to lower courts in determining what expectation 
of privacy society would deem reasonable where a rental car is concerned. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals, in State v Cutler, 144 Idaho 272 (Ct App. 2007), 
analyzed various approaches used by the federal circuit courts of appeals. It noted that 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits employed a bright-line rule, which looked only to 
whether the driver was listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement. Id. at 
274. If the driver was not listed on the agreement, "even if he or she has permission 
from a person who is an authorized driver," the driver "has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle and consequently lacks standing to complain of the vehicle's 
subjection to an allegedly unlawful search." Id. The Cutler Court also pointed out that 
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits used a "modified view of the bright-line approach" which 
only requires an unauthorized driver to show he or she has permission from the renter 
to use the car in order to have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals explained that the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. 
Smith, 263 F .3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001 ), employed a totality of the circumstances 
10 
analysis, which it then adopted. Id. It held that five factors should be considered to 
determine standing Id. Those were: "(1) whether the defendant had a driver's 
license; (2) the relationship between the unauthorized driver and the lessee; (3) the 
driver's ability to present rental documents; (4) whether the driver has the lessee's 
permission to use the car; and (5) the driver's relationship with the rental company." Id. 
Ultimately, the court held that Mr. Cutler did not have standing because, unlike the 
defendant in Smith, there was no indication that Mr. Cutler knew the authorized driver, 
Mr. Cutler did not have a relationship with the rental company, and the rental agreement 
had expired. Id. at 275-76. 
Notably, Judge Lansing's concurrence in Cutler shed light on the factor that the 
court considered the most important and why the totality approach was adopted. Judge 
Lansing said, "I write separately to express my view that in the vast majority of cases, 
the question whether the driver of a rental car had direct permission to use the car from 
the lessee or from a contractually authorized driver will be dispositive of the standing 
question." Id. at 276. Thus, Judge Lansing's "initial impulse" was to adopt the Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits' position that permission from the renter grants standing. Id. In fact, 
she went on to say that "[t]he existence of such permission should ordinarily be 
sufficient to confer a privacy interest upon the driver if and to the same extent that the 
lessee possesses such a privacy interest" Id. However, she said that the totality of the 
circumstances test was appropriate because there could be a "rare circumstance where 
a legitimate privacy interest may arise even in the absence of direct permission from the 
lessee or other authorized driver." Therefore, it is clear that the other factors would be 
significant and necessary only when there is no permission from the authorized driver. 
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In this case, the district court said that "[a)t no time in his testimony did Ross 
directly assert that he had Hunter's verbal permission (R., p.200 (emphasis in 
original).) Therefore, the district court found that Mr. Ross "did not prove he had 
Hunter's permission ... " (R., p.200.) This was clearly erroneous because it was not 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. See State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 557, 
560 (Ct. App. 2005). Indeed, at the hearing on the suppression motion, Mr. Ross made 
it clear that Mr. Hunter gave him permission to use the rental car. When asked how he 
got the car from Mr. Hunter, Mr. Ross said, "At his house. He handed me the keys, told 
me he couldn't go and gave it to me." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.23, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Ross's counsel 
then asked if Mr. Hunter made any objection to Mr. Ross taking the car, and Mr. Ross 
confirmed he did not. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.23, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Ross also confirmed that he 
was operating the car with Mr. Hunter's permission. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.23, Ls.18-20.) 
The district court acknowledged that these statements were made but 
nevertheless held that Mr. Ross did not have permission from Mr. Hunter. (R., p.200.) 
It is not clear what the district court believed was necessary to show permission, but no 
authority supports the idea that specific language must be used to grant permission. 
Indeed, Mr. Ross's recollection of his discussion with Mr. Hunter represents what is 
likely a normal series of events when an authorized driver grants permission to a friend. 
It would be highly unusual for an authorized driver to say to his friend "I hereby grant 
you permission to use the rental car." 
Additionally, this case is distinguishable from Cutler. In that case, Mr. Cutler 
stated that he was given permission to drive the car by Mr. Stewart, who was given 
permission to use it by the actual renter, Mr. Hernandez. Cutler, 144 Idaho at 273. The 
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said that "[t]here was no evidence presented regarding the relationship between 
and Hernandez, the only authorized driver-including whether they even knew 
each other." Id. at 275. As such, the court found that there was "no evidence that 
Cutler even had permission from the only authorized driver .... " Id. Thus, the court 
said that the case "presented significantly more attenuated relationships" than the Sixth 
Circuit was presented in Smith. Again, unlike the situation in Cutler, Mr. Ross knew 
Mr. Hunter well. 
Nevertheless, the district court found that Mr. Ross did not have Mr. Hunter's 
permission, and, because there was "no evidence that Ross had an intimate 
relationship with Hunter," the district court said "[n]one of the four factors in Smith" were 
"present in the instant case." (R., p.199.) The district court failed to comprehend the 
purpose of the one factor that examines the relationship between the driver and the 
lessee. When discussing that factor, the only reason that the Smith court stated that 
Mr. Smith had an "intimate relationship" with the actual renter was because the renter 
was Mr. Smith's wife. Smith, 263 F.3d at 586. It is obviously not necessary for an 
unauthorized driver to have a familial relationship with the authorized driver. The 
"relationship with the driver" factor simply considers the nature of the relationship. In 
other words, if the driver has no relationship with the renter, as was the case in Cutler, it 
is less likely that society would recognize the driver's expectation of privacy as 
legitimate. Here, Mr. Ross made it clear at the suppression hearing that Mr. Hunter was 
his best friend and boss. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.22, Ls.19-23.) He also told Deputy Gorham 
that he lived with Mr. Hunter. (Video at 4: 15 - 4:30.) 
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It was clear that Mr. Ross had Mr. Hunter's permission, and he knew Mr. Hunter 
As , he had an expectation privacy that society would recognize as 
objectively reasonable. Further, given the discrepancy between the facts in this case 
and those of Cutler, and the importance of the authorized driver's permission, Mr. Ross 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the car. Therefore, the district 
court erred when it found that Mr. Ross did not have standing to contest the search. 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress Because The 
Deputies Unlawfully Extended The Traffic Stop 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred in denying Mr. Ross's Motion to Suppress because 
Mr. Ross's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police officers prolonged his 
detention. Mr. Ross was detained well after the purpose of the stop was completed. 
Therefore, the deputies unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress 
Because The Mission Of The Stop Was Over When Deputy Gorham Told 
Mr. Ross That The Car Would Be Towed 
Mr. Ross was pulled over for failing to signal a full five seconds before changing 
lanes. That detention lasted almost 50 minutes.7 "An investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. 
Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means 
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." 
7 Mr. Ross was pulled over two minutes into the video, and Deputy Gorham did not tell 
him he was free to leave until 47 minutes later. (See Video at 1 :45 - 2:15, 48:45 -
49:15.) 
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Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 
420 (2005). 
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated this admonition when it held 
that law enforcement cannot extend a completed traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff 
without reasonable suspicion. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 
(2015). The Court specifically stated that "a police stop exceeding the time needed to 
handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against 
unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, 
therefore, 'become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to 
complete th[e] mission' of issuing a ticket for the violation." Id. at 1612 (quoting 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S at 407). The Court made it clear that unless there was 
additional reasonable suspicion, the officer had to allow the seized person to depart 
once the purpose of the stop was completed. Id. at 1614. 
The Court acknowledged that "[t]raffic stops are 'especially fraught with danger to 
police officers,' so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome 
precautions in order to complete his mission safely." Id. at 1616 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009)). The Supreme Court explained 
in Rodriguez that "[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that 
mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours." 
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, although some 
investigative detentions are permissible when based on specific, articulable facts that 
justify reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, see e.g. State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 
Idaho 609, 614 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)), safety 
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precautions taken to facilitate investigations into other potential crimes detour from the 
purpose of the stop, and such detours are unlawful. 
That is exactly what happened here. The mission of this traffic stop ended when 
Deputy Gorham issued Mr. Ross a citation for driving without privileges and told 
Mr. Ross that the rental car company required that the car be towed. Everything that 
happened beyond that point, particularly Deputy Gorham's insistence on searching 
Mr. Ross's bags, was a detour taken in an attempt to discover evidence of other crimes. 
Not only was keeping Mr. Ross's luggage not supported by any authority, it was an 
unlawful extension of the stop under the pretext of officer safety. 
Nevertheless, the district court held that the length of the stop was reasonable. 
(R, pp.200-01.) It said, 
Once stopped, the officers had the ability to confirm the 
identification of the drivers. Once Ross provided identification, the officer 
was allowed to check his driving status. That check provided the basis for 
the additional detention to issue a citation. Once Ross disclosed the fact 
that this was a rental car and that he lacked the rental agreement and the 
ability to drive the vehicle, that allowed for an additional period of 
detention for the officers to contact the rental company and find out what 
they wanted done with the rental car. The length of the detention was not 
unreasonable given what unfolded sequentially. 
(R., pp.200-01.) 
The district court completely ignored the events that took place in the 25 minutes 
after Deputy Gorham spoke with the rental car company. Indeed, had Deputy Gorham 
released Mr. Ross when he found out what the rental car company wanted, the 
detention up to that point would have been reasonable. That did not happen. 
Instead, as the video makes clear, when Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross that the 
car would be impounded, Mr. Ross asked if he could take his bags. (Video at 25:40.) 
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Instead of letting him take them, Deputy Gorham detained ML Ross for an additional 25 
minutes because the deputy refused to let him take his belongings unless he consented 
to their search. During that time, the deputies kept Mr. Ross separated from 
Mr. Cummings, and Deputy Hyle questioned Mr. Cummings regarding his address and 
phone number even though there was no evidence that Mr. Cummings had committed 
any crimes. (Video at 48:00 49:00.) Deputy Gorham also asked dispatch if there 
were any canine units in the area and was told that they were both in training. (Video at 
40: 15 - 40:45.) Not surprisingly, he then told Mr. Ross that an "inventory search" would 
be necessary. (Video at 51 :45 - 51 :55.) The deputies' actions after the purpose of the 
stop was completed were not supported by any reasonable suspicion that a crime had 
been or was about to be committed; any such suspicion that arose because Mr. Ross 
was not the renter of the car had been allayed by the records check and the call with the 
rental car company. Thus, the deputies' actions demonstrated that the deputies were 
bound and determined to search to find some evidence of criminal activity. This was a 
clear detour from the mission of the stop. Therefore, the stop violated well settled 
Supreme Court precedent, most recently reiterated in Rodriguez, and was unlawfully 
extended. 
111. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress Because 
Deputy Gorham Would Not Let Mr. Ross Take His Luggage Without Searching It First, 
And The Inventory Search Was Not Performed According To Protocol 
A Introduction 
The district court erred when it held that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 
justified a search of Mr. Ross's luggage. 
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress 
Because Deputy Gorham Told Mr. Ross That He Had To Consent To A Search 
Of His Luggage If He Wanted To Take The Luggage With Him, And The 
Deputies Did Not Follow Proper Protocol For An Inventory Search 
1. The District Court Erred When It Held That The Deputies Could Search 
Mr. Ross's Luggage For Officer Safety Reasons 
Despite the fact that the purpose of the traffic stop was completed, and Deputy 
Gorham did not have probable cause to justify a warrantless search of Mr. Ross's 
luggage, Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross that he could have his luggage only if he 
consented to a search of that luggage. This was illegal. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17. The purpose of this constitutional right 
is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by 
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against 
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). Searches or 
detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129 
(Ct. App. 2002). To overcome this 
establishing that ''the warrantless search 
the burden of 
within a well-recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement." State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007) (abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 (2014)). Additionally, "the state must show 
that even if the search was permissible 
it must still be reasonable in light of all 
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an exception to the warrant requirement, 
surrounding circumstances." Id. 
The district court held that the luggage search in this case was justified under 
v. Ohio. (R., p.201-02) However, Terry does not justify searches of luggage. 
Such a search must be justified by probable cause. See e.g. State v. Gallegos, 120 
Idaho 894, 897-98 (1991 ). Nevertheless, the district court said, "Deputy Gorham's 
request to allow a search for weapons, if Ross was allowed to take his luggage, was 
reasonable given the circumstances." (R., p.201.) It described those circumstances as 
follows: there was an axe handle in the car; Mr. Ross had a pocket knife; 
Mr. Cummings was talking on his cell phone and said that he had been stopped by the 
police; Mr. Ross "laughed unusually," and seemed nervous; Mr. Cummings was 
nervous and "seemed to have a sense of urgency on the phone when explaining they 
were stopped by the police"; Mr. Ross had prior drug convictions, and his license was 
suspended for eluding an officer; and Mr. Ross could not produce the rental agreement 
and "did not provide any direct evidence that he had the permission of the person who 
rented the car." (R., p.201.) Based on these facts, the district court said Deputy 
Gorham, 
knew that if he released Ross and Cummings with their luggage, without 
searching that luggage, he would be putting himself in a situation where 
his attention would be divided between doing an inventory search, and 
needing to keep an eye out for two persons he had just released who may 
be leaving with weapons in their luggage and who may have a reason to 
inflict harm on Deputy Hyle and himself. 
(R., pp.201-02.) Therefore, the district court held that, under Terry, Deputy Gorham 
was justified in searching the luggage. (R., p.202.) 
Terry grants no such authority to law enforcement officers. Terry does not justify 
the search of luggage. It does not justify an extended detention of this nature, and it 
certainly does not justify a law enforcement officer forcing an individual to waive his 
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Fourth Amendment rights in order to leave with his property after a traffic stop. The 
Terry Court specifically stated that when an officer reasonably believes "the persons 
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, the officer may be 
"entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which 
might be used to assault him." Id. at 30 (emphasis added). This does not authorize a 
search of belongings simply because, as Deputy Gorham said, "I don't know what's in 
those bags." The law does not support such a dismantling of the Fourth Amendment. 
Deputy Gorham frisked Mr. Ross before he had him get in the patrol car. If Terry 
justified searches of luggage in the trunk of a car as the district court held, then law 
enforcement officers making any traffic stop could detain an individual to search all 
containers in the car if the driver had a prior record, behaved nervously, and had 
something that could be used as a weapon in the passenger compartment. 
Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has said that "because it is common for people 
to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement regardless of 
criminal activity, a person's nervous demeanor during such an encounter is of limited 
significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion." State v. Gibson, 141 
Idaho 277, 285-86 (2005) (citing Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir.2001); 
United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir.1998); United States v. Fernandez, 
18 F.3d 874,879 (10th Cir.1994)). 
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that law enforcement is a 
dangerous job. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. Despite such dangers, the Court said 
that safety precautions taken to facilitate on-scene investigation into other crimes 
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"detours" from the mission of the traffic stop. Id This is precisely what occurred here. 
As argued to the district court, "The police cannot simply say the words 'officer safety' 
and have them become a talismanic shield obviating the need to apply and uphold the 
Article I, Section 17 safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure." (R., p.189.) 
Furthermore, the district court's conclusion that, given the facts, "a reasonably 
prudent man would have felt his safety was at issue, that 'he has reason to believe that 
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual .... "' was not supported by the 
facts. (R., p.202.) Mr. Ross and Mr. Cummings were cooperative during the entire 
course of the stop; Mr. Ross promptly stepped out of the car when directed to do so; 
Mr. Ross "submitted to a frisk of his person" without argument, and no weapons or 
contraband were found; the deputies did not feel it was necessary to detain either of the 
men with handcuffs; Deputy Gorham asked Mr. Ross to sit in the front seat of the patrol 
vehicle; Mr. Ross admitted his driver's license was suspended; the rental vehicle was 
not stolen; the records check did not reveal that Mr. Ross had a history of violent 
crimes; and at no time did Mr. Ross or Mr. Cummings act aggressively or communicate 
any threat to the deputies. (R., pp.188-89.) Indeed, Mr. Ross was, according to Deputy 
Gorham, "very cordial." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.67, Ls.6-17.) 
In short, officers cannot simply claim that a detained person might have and use 
weapons in luggage, especially when there are many facts that would dispel such a 
notion. This stop also took place in broad daylight on Interstate 90. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.31, 
Ls.3-8.) Thus, as Mr. Ross's counsel argued below, the deputies "did not have 
sufficient objective and articulable facts to support a reasonable belief that Ross' 
luggage contained a weapon and that, if it did, that such was a legitimate threat to their 
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safety." (R., p.189.) Allowing searches of luggage based on hunches in order to make 
jobs safer would swallow the Amendment 
2. The Inventory Search Was Not Performed According To Established 
Protocol, And The State Failed To Prove That The Search Was 
Reasonable 
The deputies tried to justify the search of Mr. Ross's luggage as an inventory 
search. When a car is lawfully impounded, law enforcement is permitted to inventory its 
contents. "Such warrantless inventory searches, when conducted in compliance with 
standard and established police procedures and not as a pretext for criminal 
investigation, do not offend Fourth Amendment strictures against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995) (citing Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 
(1976); State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80-81 (1991 )). Additionally, the United States 
Supreme Court has said that established protocol "must regulate the opening of 
containers found during inventory searches" because "an inventory search must not be 
a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." Florida v. 
Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3 (1980); see also Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375. 
Here, Deputy Gorham testified that impounding a rental car and performing an 
inventory search prior to the car being towed to a rental car office was standard policy. 
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.83, Ls.5-7.) The questioning went as follows: 
Q: Well, what is your understanding of your authority to conduct an 
inventory? 
A: My understanding is every time we tow a vehicle it's being 
inventoried is the policy at Kootenai County. 
Q: And what does that mean? 
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A: It means every time we authorize a vehicle to be impounded it will 
be inventoried. 
Q· Again, what does it mean to inventory it? 
A: Search the entire contents for items of value 
Q: And what's the purpose of that? 
A: Like I stated before, I don't know the purpose of it, that's above my 
pay grade, but I imagine it's a liability issue. 
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.83, Ls.3-16.) The State never proved that there was an inventory policy 
regarding the search of closed containers. It did not file an exhibit to that effect. Its 
argument was based solely on Deputy Gorham's testimony. In its briefing, it simply 
said, Deputy Gorham's "inventory was in accordance with the departmental policy of the 
sheriff's office at the time." (R., p.80.) This is exactly what the United States Supreme 
Court was concerned about in Bertine and Wells. Without a clear policy, there is no 
regulation of searches, and what can be searched is left to the discretion of law 
enforcement. In Bertine, the State proved there was a policy allowing the opening of 
closed containers and, therefore, the search of a closed container was constitutional. 
Id. at 374. In Wells, the Court held that, because there was no policy at all, the search 
of a closed container was unlawful. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5. 
The district court apparently assumed without deciding that there was a policy 
and that Deputy Gorham followed that policy because it made no findings with respect 
to whether the inventory search was conducted according to department policy, or the 
well-established standards articulated in Wells and Bertine, even though Mr. Ross's 
counsel raised the issue in his briefing, and the State responded. (See R., pp.135-37, 
179-80.) 
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More importantly, Deputy Hyle testified that his role in an inventory search was 
completing the inventory paperwork. 9/30/14, p 92, Ls.11-1 He said, "I 
completed the inventory paperwork." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.92, L.13.) This is not supported by 
the evidence. Indeed, the video shows that the search had none of the earmarks of a 
proper inventory search. (Video at 52:45 - 53:30.) Deputy Hyle was definitely not 
completing any paperwork, and Deputy Gorham simply rummaged through the luggage 
in the trunk until he found something incriminating. The video makes it obvious that, 
much like Deputy Gorham's insistence that he be allowed to search the luggage for 
safety, the inventory search was also a pretext to pursue a hunch that there was 
contraband in the luggage. This was not an inventory search. No one documented the 
contents of the luggage; the deputies simply poked through the luggage, looking for 
something incriminating. Therefore, the search was illegal. 
3. All Evidence Collected Following Mr. Ross's Prolonged Detention And The 
Unlawful Inventory Search Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The 
Illegal Governmental Activity 
The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only 
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990). The test is 
"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 
488. Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have 
come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct." State v. Wigginton, 
142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct App. 2005). 
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Deputies illegally prolonged Mr. Ross's detention after the mission of the stop 
was completed. Further, as Mr. Ross's counsel argued below, Deputy Gorham's 
"insistence on consent to a search" before allowing Mr. Ross to take his property "left 
Ross facing the dilemma of consenting to a search thereby waiving his right to privacy 
under Article I, Section 17 (and the Fourth Amendment) before taking it with him, or 
abandoning his property and thereby also subjecting it to search through the inventory 
process." (R., p.136.) Finally, the search itself was clearly unlawful because it was not 
conducted pursuant to established protocol but was simply a ruse so the deputies could 
do an investigatory search of Mr. Ross's property. The State failed to meet its burden of 
showing that the search was reasonable and that the evidence was untainted; therefore, 
all the incriminating evidence collected must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police 
activity. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ross respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment 
and sentence, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand the case 
to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 2015. 
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